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systems, each a precision-guided
weapon project and a mission-planning
system.
The book’s foremost merit is its sober
analysis, grounded in business economics. Each case covers technological, economic, and operational trade-offs and
frames each project within a relevant
and timely international business context. For example, Hasik’s space-system
case emphasizes the competencies and
alliances of the few firms competing in
the satellite business. He explores the
credible competition for the SpaceBased Infrared System Low (SBIRS
Low) satellite contract by the fivehundred-employee Spectrum Astro
Corporation against the established and
significantly larger firm TRW Inc.
Hasik’s land-vehicle case demonstrates
how the DoD benefited from decades of
prior research and development in
South Africa on blast-resistant vehicle
design, greatly accelerating the Army’s
and Marine Corps’s adaptations for our
current wars. As a bonus, Hasik adroitly
presents the academically rigorous
clearly, and for a reader accustomed to
plowing through the arcane prose of
technical reports and academic papers,
this is no small gift.
The Department of Defense is constantly looking for innovative technologies through its service labs and several
science and technology development
programs. The enduring challenge is in
managing the underlying risk and in the
integration into a complex system-ofsystems life cycle amid competing priorities, operational commitments, and
assessments of the future strategic environment. Although this book could be
more comprehensive, it need not be.
Through his case-study selection and
opening and closing synthesizing

chapters, Hasik provides a cogent and
instructive assessment of innovative
technology development and procurement approaches across defense system
sectors. Arms and Innovation suggests
opportunities for more nimble defense
systems innovation in the future, opportunities that do not require comprehensive acquisition reforms or
reiterations of revolutions in military
affairs.
DAVID FOSTER

Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division
China Lake, California

Yoo, John. Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George
W. Bush. New York: Kaplan, 2009. 524pp. $29.95

John Yoo’s most recent book is far
more than a defense of the George W.
Bush administration, which he served,
as some of his many critics may find it.
In fact, Crisis and Command is a carefully documented study of the exercise
of presidential power from George
Washington to President Obama. This
is the last book in a trilogy by Yoo, the
first two being The Powers of War and
Peace (2005), which explains the founders’ original understanding of the
foreign-affairs power within the
Constitution, and War by Other Means
(2006), which discusses the law and
logic behind the Bush administration’s
counterterrorism policies. This study
extends well beyond the Bush administration, focusing mainly on Presidents
Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt. In each of
these respected leaders Yoo finds bold
presidents who changed the existing political order and transformed it into
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their own. They found distinction by
leading the nation through crises, carefully shaping the direction of national
security policy and recasting the
boundaries of presidential authority.
Through careful historical analysis, Yoo
reminds us that the relationship between presidential greatness and the
exercise of executive power is an
inextricable link that has always taken
advantage of the vague contours of Article II of the Constitution, which addresses executive authority. In his
historical analysis, Yoo carefully traces
the founders’ work at the Constitutional Convention to accommodate the
executive’s energy and decisiveness
within a workable constitutional
framework.
In quelling the Whiskey Rebellion and
addressing the Indian uprisings of
1789–90, the first U.S. president believed that Congress having created a
military, he had the authority to decide
when and how to use it. In the latter
case, Washington sought no authority
from Congress when he directed an attack on the Wabash and Illinois Indians
150 miles within their territory. Similarly, in the Prize Cases, President Lincoln concluded, and the Supreme Court
agreed, that after hostile acts are directed against this nation the president
is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any legislative authority.
President Roosevelt went even farther
prior to the Second World War by taking action to assist Britain through the
Lend-Lease program and to isolate Japan from critical resources without
congressional approval or consultation,
actions that clearly provoked Japan and
drew the United States ever closer to
war.
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A later section in the book reflects the
application of this lengthy historical
analysis to the current administration
and to the response of the Bush administration to 9/11. Yoo points out that
President Bush looked to former presidents for support of his actions. He
states succinctly that “Congress simply
does not have the ability to make effective, long-term national security decisions because of the difficulty in
organizing 535 legislators and the political incentives that drive them toward
short-term, risk-averse thinking.”
In his closing thoughts, Yoo reflects on
President Obama’s early determination
to close the detention facility at
Guantanamo, to terminate the CIA’s
special authority to question terrorists,
and to suspend military commissions in
the middle of the trials of al-Qa‘ida
leaders for war crimes. Describing the
new president’s law enforcement approach to terrorist violence, he asks
whether this approach, although popular with his liberal supporters, can be
successful. He suggests that the new
president may be learning to “draw on
the mainspring of Presidential power as
deeply as his greatest predecessors.”
COL. JAMES P. TERRY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, RETIRED

Chairman, Veterans Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Cloud, David, and Greg Jaffe. The Fourth Star:
Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future
of the United States Army. New York: Crown,
2009. 330pp. $28

Journalists David Cloud and Greg Jaffe
have attempted to provide a narrative
of the U.S. Army from the end of the
Vietnam War through the present wars
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